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''Huffman v. Office of Personnel Management'', 263 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001) is a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit addressing a two decade-old conflict between the United States Congress and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit over the depth of whistleblower protection available to federal civilian employees covered by the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989. The discourse revolves around the meaning of the word 'any'. == Facts of the case == The complainant, Kenneth Huffman alleged that he made protected disclosures to Inspector General Patrick McFarland of the Office of Personnel Management, including that McFarland improperly preselected an agency employee for the Senior Executive Service (SES). The allegation included the accusation that the complainant was removed as an Assistant Inspector General following these communications.〔Mahoney and Jeffery, PLLC, ''What Constitutes Whistleblowing'', WIFLE (Women in Federal Law Enforcement) E-News (Sept. ( 2009 )).〕 Huffman's removal prompted his complaint under the Whistleblower Protection Act. In 1994, the United States Congress passed an amendment to the Act. The legislative history of that amendment stated, “ . . . it also is not possible to further clarify the clear language in section 2302(b)(8) that protection for ‘any’ whistleblowing disclosure truly means ‘any.’ A protected disclosure may be made as part of an employee’s job duties, may concern policy or individual misconduct, and may be oral or written and to any audience inside or outside the agency, without restriction to time, place, motive or content.”〔Remarks of the Honorable Carl Levin (D-MI), United States Senator, Cong. Rec. (June 10, 2003) at (14238-9 ).〕 Under Sentaor Levin's view, Huffman's disclosures would have been protected. Huffman took his case to the Merit Systems Protection Board, which held that it did not have jurisdiction under the Whistleblower Protection Act to intervene in Huffman's removal.〔Huffman v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. DC-1221-99-0178-W-1 (M.S.P.B. Mar. 25, 1999) (initial decision). Huffman v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 84 M.S.P.R. 569, 570 (Dec. 14, 1999) (final order).〕 The case was argued before Chief Judge Mayer and Circuit Judges Bryson and Dyk of the Federal Circuit. James M. Eisenmann of Passman & Kaplan, P.C. argued for Huffman. James C. Caine was the trial attorney for the Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice argued for the Office of Personnel Management.〔Huffman v. Office of Personnel Management, 263 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. (2001 )).〕 The government argued that whistleblower disclosures to persons who did not have authority to correct wrongdoing were not entitled to protection under the statute. The Federal Circuit remanded the case with respect to Huffman's disclosures concerning the conduct of employees other than his immediate supervisor. == The Rule as a Summarization of Existing Case Law == Despite this Congressional intent in the 1994 amendment, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit curtailed the scope of federal law by defining some communications outside the definition of ‘whistleblower’. A series of Federal Circuit cases subsequent to 1994 took a narrow view of the scope of whistleblower protection. In ''Horton v. Dep’t of the Navy'', the court ruled that communications to co-workers, the wrong-doer, or to a supervisor were not acts of whistleblowing.〔Levin remarks at (14239 ); see also Robert G. Vaughn, ''Merit Systems Protection Board: Rights and Remedies'' (American Lawyer Media 2004) at (§ 15.03(3) ); Barbara Sapin, 'Beyond Garcetti: The Limits of Protection' in ''Retaliation and Whistleblowers'' (Kluwer Law International 2009) at (605 ).〕 In ''Willis v. Dep’t of Agriculture'', the court ruled that a whistleblower’s disclosures to officials in the agency chain of command or those made in the course of normal duties were not protected. Then, finally, the court issued ''Huffman v. Office of Personnel Management'', reaffirming ''Horton'' and ''Willis'' through the rule in ''Huffman''.〔 Levin remarks at (14239 ).〕 Finally, in ''Meuwissen v. Dep't'' of the Interior, the court rule that a whistleblower’s communication of previously known information does not qualify as a disclosure. In 2003, Senator Carl Levin of Michigan took to the Senate floor and noted that “()ll of these rulings violate clear Congressional intent to afford broad protection to whistleblower disclosures.”〔 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Huffman v. Office of Personnel Management」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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